Abstract. The article reports on some judgements of the Court of Justice EU concerning analogy, commenting them. Passages from the cases OMEL v ONEL, PAGO, GOOGLE, .eu Top Domain, DIOR are quoted. Then the question is raised: should it be considered as an analogy or a precedent? Defi nition of the notion "analogy" in French, English and German law are compared. The fi rst conclusion is that analogy is understood in different ways by lawyers in these Member States of the EU. The second conclusion is that by a Hungarian lawyer's understanding most of the examples quoted are rather precedents than true analogies. Moreover, it is observed that in translations identical terms ought to be used.
Analogies are probably as old as case law itself. More than two thousand years ago in the Twelve Tables (lex duodecim tabularum) it was ruled that "If the father sells his son three times, the son should get rid of his father's authority."
1 This seems to be a precedent of today's analogy. In the practice, Roman law, like English law was analogist. 2 Going even further, by the Romans analogy was taken over from Greek philosophy. 3 Probably the analogist method was already used at the ancient Greek courts (agora).
I mentioned the above only as introduction. My topic is the case law of the Court of Justice EU and I start with a recent case.
OMEL v ONEL

4
The essence of the case history is that the applicant fi led the term OMEL for registration as a mark with the Benelux Intellectual Property Offi ce. The opponent is owner of the Community trade mark ONEL, which was registered for almost identical services and he opposed for confusing similarity of the younger mark.
The applicant asked, as it often happens, that the opponent provides proof of genuine use of his mark in the Community. As the opponent was able to prove use only in the Netherlands, the opposition was dismissed by the Benelux Offi ce.
The opponent appealed the decision before the Tribunal of Gravenhagen. The latter decided to stay proceedings and referred for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice EU 5 in respect of the requirements of territorial borders of genuine use of a Community trade mark. The question concerned essentially whether a Community trade mark having been put to a genuine use in just one Member State, met the standard required by the EU Trademark Regulation. 6 Art. 15 (1) of the TM Regulation provides that lack of use "in the Community" within a period of fi ve years can result that the Community trade mark will be revoked. Let me stress that the wording of the TM Regulation says only "in the Community" and nothing else.
The laconism of this provision provoked the question for years: which territory is necessary concerning the use of a Community trade mark in order that it becomes incontestable. The practice of the EU Trademark Offi ce (OHIM) in Alicante was that the use in just one Member State should be suffi cient. But some Member States, like Hungary or Belgium were not satisfi ed with this practice, moreover many practitioners criticised it saying that it was not practical in a European Union consisting of 27 different countries.
It is not surprising that in the procedure of the preliminary ruling there participated not only the parties, but also the Governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, Moreover, they attended the Hearing, too, where some of them (like Hungary as well) completed the arguments explained in the observations in their speeches.
The Court of Justice EU ruled in its judgement 9 that the territorial borders of the Member States ought to be disregarded, but listed several circumstances which should be assessed.
10
Many comments were published on the case: by different authors in Hungary: Hegedűs, Gonda and the author of this paper, moreover in Belgium, in Germany, in the Netherlands, in the U.K., etc. more than 25 countries.
The Hungarian Intellectual Property Offi ce in his e-mail Newsletter published a short report 11 on the judgement adding that it greets "as it confi rms the case law of the Hungarian Intellectual Property Offi ce, moreover it agrees in its main arguments with the viewpoint of the Hungarian Government as explained in the Observations fi led and in speech at the Hearing with the Court."
More important was that OHIM amended his Manual on Proof of Use, 12 aligning with the statements of the Court of Justice EU.
As this paper seeks to focus on the methods of analogy I limit myself on the relevant items of the judgement.
In the considerations it is said: 
The Court has also stated that the territorial scope of use is only one of several factors taken into account (see Sunrider v OHIM para 76). That interpretation may be applied by analogy to Community trademarks since in requiring that the trademark be put in genuine use, the TM Directive
Comments
Subject of the Sunrider 14 case was an opposition against the application for registration of a Community trade mark. Both cases (OMEL v ONEL as well as Sunrider) had to be decided in conformity with the TM Regulation. Reference to the TM Directive seems to me only strengthening the position taken by the Court. As a result I mean that this reference was not for a real analogy as we understand in Hungarian, German 15 etc. law. In my understanding it was a precedent, or according to the terms often used by the Court of Justice EU in other cases "it is a well established case law that…" (il est de jurisprudence constante…).
But it cannot be excluded that under French, English etc. laws the notion precedent is broader.
Later the same judgement says: 
First I observe that purpose and function of the TM Regulation and the TM Directive are different. The fi rst one is provided for sui generis trade marks having effect on the whole Community. Contrary to it the TM Directive aims harmonisation of traditional trade mark law of the Member States, i.e. of national law in each of the 27 Member States.
Consequently, as from the case law referred, in Ansul the preliminary ruling was ordered in view of the request of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, in the La Mer Technology in view of the request of the British High Court of Justice (with respect to the Sunrider case see the previous comment). As a result, these cases were not decided as interpretation of the TM Regulation, but by considering the TM Directive. Applying analogy in respect of these two cases could be approved, I believe, by jurists of all the 27 Member States.
14 C-416/04. 15 In the German version of the judgement one can read instead the word "analogy": "Bei der entsprechenden Anwendung der … angeführten Rechtsprechung…" (corresponding application of the referred case law). 16 In paragraph 29 cited, referred are the cases C-40/01 Ansul para 43, C-416/04 Sunrider v OHIM para 70, C-259/02 La Mer Technology para 27.
PAGO
17
The Community trade mark PAGO is used by an Austrian company for fruit juices and reputed in that country. In the infringement procedure against a company residing in the same country the Austrian Supreme Court requested preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice EU on the extent of the territorial protection of a Community trade mark, which is reputed in one country only.
In its reply the Court of Justice EU referred to analogy relating to several aspects of the discussed case. Namely:
The 
It cannot be required that the Community trade mark be known by a given percentage of the public so defi ned (CHEVY -General Motors, by way of analogy, para 25 -para 23 of the PAGO judgement). The degree of knowledge required must be considered to be reached when the Community trade mark is known by a signifi cant part of the public concerned by the products or services covered by that trade mark (CHEVY -General Motors, by way of analogy, para 26 -para 24 of the PAGO judgement). In examining this condition, the national court must take into consideration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in promoting it (CHEVY -General Motors, by way of analogy, para 27 -para 25 of the PAGO judgement). Territorially, the condition as to reputation must be considered to be fulfi lled when the Community trade mark has a reputation in a substantial part of the territory of the Community (see, by way of analogy, CHEVY -General Motors, para 28 -para 27 of the PAGO judgement).
Comments
The case referred as analogy related to the trade mark CHEVY registered in the Benelux, moreover the relating preliminary ruling was ordered following the request of a Belgian Tribunal, i.e. based on the TM Directive and not on the TM Regulation. As a result, the references to analogy are not unwarranted.
GOOGLE
19
In the frame of the great variety of his activity, Google presents also advertisements. It happened that among the keywords used for search in the Internet some were identical or similar to some well-established marks of others differing from the advertisers. The owner of the Community trade mark LV and Luis Vuitton sued Google for infringement committed by the use of such keywords.
The French Supreme Court requested the Court of Justice EU to render preliminary ruling on the question whether the use of a mark as a keyword in the Internet can constitute trade mark infringement.
In 
Comments
The referred ARSENAL judgement was made in view of the request of the High Court of Justice (U.K.) relating to the interpretation of the TM Directive, the BUDWEISERAnheuser Busch judgement was rendered in view of the request of the Supreme Court of Finland in respect of the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. As a result, applying analogy, referring to these cases seems to me convincing though the application of the solution referred could also be called as "precedent". it is apparent from the order of reference that the appellant in the main proceedings lodged 180 such applications." Though this case is only "neighbouring" to trademark cases, it is worth noting that the Court of Justice EU referred in it as follows: 
.eu Top Level Domain
The
Comments
Though the domain name Regulation 874/2004/EC provides on bad faith, as there is no case law in respect of domain names especially relating to bad faith, the Court of Justice EU held it for useful to refer to trademark case law by analogy. I think this is the most speaking example in respect of applying analogy from one legal fi eld to another.
Analogy or Precedent?
In the case law of the Court of Justice EU there are of course further judgements in which reference is made to analogies. From the trademark world let me quote the DIOR case, 22 in which the French licensee sold products under the DIOR mark to a discount store. In the judgement it was said: of the Courts in France, resp., in the United Kingdom, relating to national marks, in respect of interpretation of the rules of the TM Directive. As a result, like the above-reported paragraphs of the case OMEL v ONEL paragraphs 54 and 55, or in the case PAGO paragraphs 22-25, 27 analogy is referred to similar previous cases.
In German, Hungarian, Czech etc. laws references of this kind are considered mostly as precedents and not as analogies.
It is interesting to note that the term "analogy" can be found only in the French and English texts of the judgements, but not in the German ones.
The differences in translation are probably not simply result of translators' leisureliness, but the inherent cause of it may be a different concept of analogy in the French and English doctrine and the German one.
The notion of analogy in different regimes
In the French Legal Dictionary we can read: reasoning with analogy: 25 A classic legal interpretation method which is based on interpreting the text. Its essence is to extend the ruling presented in a text to a case of a similar nature, even if the latter is not specifi ed in the text in question, and to show that the reason for applying the rule is identical in the two cases. This is demonstrated if, by the ratio legis, the similarity of the two cases is determinant for applying the rule.
In Garner's English-American Dictionary we can read: analogy; analog(ue): 26 An analogy is a corresponding similarity or likeness; in logic, analogy means "an inference that, if two or more things are similar in some respects, they must be alike in others."
An analogue is a thing that is analogous to something else. For example "The Esso decision suggests that analogues to such traditional equity doctrines as laches, election of remedies, and estoppels may justify a fi nding of peculiar circumstances." (The spelling analog should be confi ned to technical contexts involving physics or computers.)
And at last two German Legal Dictionaries: In Brockhaus 27 we can read: Analogy, is reasonable application of a legal provision not regulated by statutory law, to a similar situation. As a result, this is not an interpretation, but fi lling of a gap of the statutory law… 25 Vocabulaire Juridique, Paris, 2001.
*raisonnement par analogie: Procédé classique d'*interpretation rationnelle, relevant de la methode* exégétique qui consiste à étendre la solution édictée par un texte pour un cas à un cas semblable non prévu par le texte, en montrant que la raison d'appliquer la règle a démontré lorsque, dans la ratio legis, ce en quoi les cas sont semblables est determinant pour l'application de la règle. 26 In the Lexicon of Law 28 we can read: Analogy, is the due equalization of two different situations. As a result, analogy is possibly relating to another situation if there is a gap in the Act…
Comparing the French and English defi nitions with the German ones it is outstanding that the fi rst ones follow a more general concept of the notion "analogy" than the German ones. Let us call the French and English ones using a Latin term (as it is common even today in Hungarian law) analogia iuris.
The German defi nitions of the notion analogy are more restrictive, they require a gap in the statutory law, moreover, as it stands in the Brockhaus defi nition, the method is not an interpretation (contrary to the French defi nition). This kind of analogy is called in Hungarian law analogia legis.
To be precise, the distinction between analogia iuris and analogia legis is not a specialty of Hungarian law, it has its origin probably in medieval pandects. This supposition can be sustained by the fact, that in German law we can fi nd this distinction even today, though the Latin terms are replaced by German ones (Rechtsanalogie, Gesetzesanalogie). 29 The different concept of the same notion is therefore only refl ected in translations of the same judgements it is not a hit of German translators. In this respect I refer to the observation of Urban 30 and Király, 31 who state that "professional translators of European law can only aim for an approximate equivalence" (and not for a perfect identity).
My fi rst conclusion is therefore that the notion of analogy is understood differently by lawyers of these three Member States.
It can give comfort to the reader that the use of analogies or precedents serves the principle of consequentiality, which is one of the main postulates of legal technique in the culture of modern formal law. 32 
